Although the eu Commission as negotiation leader in the field of external trade matters which, after Lisbon, also include investment will not issue a Model Investment Treaty, a number of its statements together with reactions by the Council and the Parliament allow the observer to draw conclusions as to the likely content of such future agreements. In addition, those trade agreements with investment chapters which are already close to finalization, like the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (ceta), provide telling insights concerning the main features of an eu agreement on investment protection.
With the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty,4 the assertion of the new extended Common Commercial Policy powers5 of the eu led to a series of documents adopted in the institutional triangle shedding some light on the likely future use of these powers in the investment field. In July 2010, the Commission adopted a Policy Communication, entitled "Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy."6 This Communication received comments by the other eu institutions; most importantly among them were the Council Conclusions of 25 October 20107 and the European Parliament's Resolution of 6 April 2011.8
All these documents contain important information on various aspects of future eu investment agreements to be concluded with third parties. However, they are all drafted on a level of generality that clearly falls short of containing any precise textual elements that could be used in future eu bits and iias. It was thus not surprising that the attention of the 'Model bit seekers' was soon directed towards actual negotiating fora. When the Commission negotiations with Canada on a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (ceta) 9 On the negotiations with Canada see Céline Lévesque, ' including an investment chapter started,9 it became clear that these negotiations could provide valuable insight into the course adopted by the eu in fashioning its investment agreements. While the Commission remained successful in keeping its low-profile, bureaucratic negotiating approach confidential, the high-profile negotiating directives given to it by the Council were leaked at some stage. These Council Negotiating Directives of 12 September 201110 concerning the negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore contain valuable information on the eu's official position with regard to a number of investment related issues. They suggest that an investment chapter should include fair and equitable treatment (fet), full protection and security, national treatment and most-favoured-nation (mfn) treatment as well as guarantees against uncompensated expropriation and probably an umbrella clause. As regards the level of detail, the instructions appear to favour the traditional European approach by adhering to a rather concise treaty text, without clarifications limiting the scope of fet and indirect expropriation as they are known from us and Canadian bits as well as nafta. In fact, avoidance of 'nafta-contamination' was reportedly a specific wish of some Member State officials.11 With regard to dispute settlement, the need for direct investor-state arbitration seemed to be unquestioned, though the precise contours were still open given the difficulty of access to icsid (and icsid Additional Facility) dispute settlement which appear to be the Commission's favourite venues.
Meanwhile the Canada-EU ceta negotiations have progressed to a state which allowed the Commission President and the Canadian Trade Minister to announce in mid-October 2013 that the ceta deal had been approved in principle.12 This, of course, did not mean that the text of all chapters would have been finalized. Rather, the nitty-gritty still needs to be negotiated and whether this will be completed soon or not is uncertain. Most recently this uncertainty was increased by parallel developments surrounding the eu-us negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip). The beginning of the negotiations in mid-2013 were already politically overshadowed by waves of new revelations concerning us spying activities directed against eu member state governments. But towards the end of 2013, a number of press reports highly critical of investment protection and, in particular, of its core element, investor-state dispute settlement (isds) gained such momentum that the Commission interrupted the negotiations and announced a 'reflection period' in late January 2014.13 These developments certainly have repercussions also on other eu investment treaty negotiations. It implies that any speculations about the shape of future eu investment treaties that may permit glimpses of a still invisible eu Model bit remain highly uncertain.
Nevertheless, while also other investment negotiations with Japan and China as well as a number of North African and East Asian countries are ongoing,14 the investment chapter of the Canada-EU ceta is at present the most advanced negotiating product. Although its final text still awaits publication, some preliminary versions of the investment chapter have been leaked and may provide guidance to investment scholars seeking a fuller picture of how future eu iias might look like.
Thus, the Draft ceta Investment Texts (supplemented by the Draft ceta Dispute Settlement) of May and November 201315 are the crucial texts which have been relied upon by most contributors to this Special Issue in order to ascertain the more precise features of a future eu bit/iia. The following reflections will not attempt to recapitulate the findings of the authors. Rather, they build on them and ponder whether the expected outcome of the Canadaeu ceta investment chapter still resembles the European approach to bits as a short treaty with standards formulated on a rather high level of generality. Apparently, there will also be no exclusion of 'speculative forms of investment' as demanded by the ep.23 In practice, of course, it would appear difficult to distinguish between 'speculative' and 'non-speculative' portfolio (or even direct) investment. 24 What is quite remarkable, however, is the fact that the introductory "chapeau" of the investment definition of the Draft ceta contains language reminiscent of the so-called Salini elements25 which have played a major role in icsid arbitration as a jurisdictional hurdle ensuring that only true 'investment' disputes and not any ordinary commercial dispute should be heard by icsid tribunals. The draft definition of an investment contains the following slightly tautological language: "Every kind of asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, which has the characteristics of an investment, such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk, and a certain duration."26
To include such language in the definition of investment is remarkable for various reasons. First, the Salini criteria are jurisprudentially developed elements giving content to the undefined jurisdictional requirement of an 'investment ' Conversely, it is also generally accepted that in investment disputes arbitrated outside the icsid framework, only the jurisdictional requirements under the applicable bit need to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, some recent non-icsid tribunals seem to have 'espoused' at least some of the Salini elements.29 The current Draft ceta text could be regarded as a manifestation of the political will of the negotiating parties to create an additional hurdle ensuring that only a more limited number of 'true' investments will be protected by the investment chapter.
What is probably most interesting is the fact that the language found in the present Draft ceta text does not contain the most controversial feature of the Salini criteria, the "contribution to the development of the host State". has no substantial business activities in the territory of the Party under whose law it is constituted or organized"). 38
See, e.g., Article 3(1) Canadian Model fipa 2004 ("Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.") <italaw .com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf> (5 March 2014).
Though the precise delimitation is difficult, this general approach is in line with both icsid and non-icsid cases.35 Another limiting approach is also evident in the draft definition of investors contained the current ceta text. The definitional part of the ceta refers to an investor as "a natural person or an enterprise of a Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an investment in the territory of the other Party."36 As regards natural persons, the text refers to citizenship, concerning enterprises the main criterion appears to be incorporation. With regard to the latter, the draft ceta makes clear that mere shell companies incorporated in either of the parties should not benefit from the investment protection under the agreement. This is not done by a denial of benefits clause, which is often difficult to handle in practice, but rather by a definitional clarification excluding enterprises without any "substantial business activities" in either of the parties.37
3.2
Admission/Market Access Opening up domestic markets to foreign investors is one of the main purposes of trade and investment agreements. The traditional bit approach is to improve the legal protection for foreign investors which should induce them to invest. However, they usually do not oblige host states to admit foreign investors, thus leaving this issue to their discretion. Only gradually, us and Canadian bits have changed course and provided for market access through expanding national treatment also to the pre-investment or establishment phase.38
Another technique to open up domestic markets to foreign investors is to provide for specific market access rules in a gats style, indicating the types and volume of investment from the other contracting party/ies that should be admitted.39 This approach was followed by the ec/eu in the preLisbon era, when its Common Commercial Policy powers did not include an express fdi power and could arguably have been extended only to the trade-like aspects of access to foreign markets,40 as opposed to substantive treatment. In a number of free trade agreements, the ec adopted such a gatsinspired market access approach and made specific commitments in specific areas.41 While it was clear that the eu institutions were generally determined to continue a policy of market liberalisation,42 it was less clear which course to adopt for the future, whether to have separate provisions on market access or to extend national treatment to the pre-investment stage.43 The draft ceta text shows that it is primarily the latter (Canadian) approach that was pursued. Its national treatment obligation extends to "establishment, acquisition (and possibly expansion) of investments."44
In addition, the draft ceta contains a provision on market access in the form of prohibitions of specific limitations to foreign investors45 coupled with a prohibition of performance requirements.46 
3.3
Substantive Treatment The core of any iia or bit concluded by eu member states in the past has always been a rather similarly phrased set of substantive treatment standards: Typically, the twin obligations of fair and equitable treatment as well as full protection and security -often even contained in a single provision -and the two non-discrimination obligations of national treatment and mfn, frequently supplemented by prohibitions of arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. A further cornerstone of European bits has always been the guarantee that investors would not be expropriated -directly or indirectly -except in the public interest, in a non-discriminatory way, according to due process and -most important in practice -under the condition that they receive adequate, prompt and effective compensation. Less uniformly contained in bits are socalled umbrella clauses, while 'free transfer of funds' guarantees are regularly found in iias.
3.3.1
Expropriation With regard to the formulation of the expropriation standard, apparently eu negotiators could not avoid some degree of 'nafta contamination.'47 The draft ceta expropriation provision starts out as the typical clause found in many European bits.48 However, it is expressly made subject to the clarifications in an annex on expropriation which basically reproduces the shared understandings already expressed in the Canadian Model bit 200449 and the us Model bit 2012.50
This ceta understanding sets out that a finding of indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry and provides a number of relevant factors, such as the economic impact of the measure, its duration, the extent to which it interferes with "distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations," and the character of the measure or series of measures, notably their object, context and intent, in order to determine whether specific measures constitute indirect expropriation. Finally, the understanding contains the police powers doctrine-inspired language trying to ensure that bona fide regulation in the public interest should not be considered expropriatory.51 This is in line with the November 2013 Commission Factsheet on 'Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in eu agreements' which specifically stated "that future eu agreements will provide a detailed set of provisions giving guidance to arbitrators on how to decide whether or not a government measure constitutes indirect expropriation. In particular, when the state is protecting the public interest in a non-discriminatory way, the right of the state to regulate should prevail over the economic impact of those measures on the investor."52 It seems that the Commission thereby adopted not only the Canadian approach, but also followed the wishes of the European Parliament to find a "clear and fair balance between public welfare objectives and private interests" in defining indirect expropriation. A breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article.55
Obviously, the negotiators have tried to navigate between the Scylla of overdetermination and the Charybdis of vagueness. At the same time this is an interesting example of the potential feedback between treaty-makers and investment tribunals. It is evident that the ceta drafters have incorporated many elements found in arbitration practice, but it is also clear that they have, presumably intentionally, not adopted all of these elements. As has been rightly stressed by Ursula Kriebaum,56 'stability' is an element usually found in attempts to define the content of fet57 which is missing here. This could be viewed as an indication that the parties intended not to make the ceta's fet version too 'investorfriendly.' It seems to underline the intention, expressed in the November 2013 Commission Fact sheet, to "reaffirm the right of the Parties to regulate to pursue legitimate public policy objectives" and to "set out precisely what elements are covered and thus prohibited" by fet in eu investment agreements.58 Such mutual interdependence of treaty-makers and investment tribunals is also emphasized by a provision in the ceta fet clause that offers the Contracting Parties a possibility to review and clarify the specific content of fet by adding further elements.59 This is an interesting alternative to the authoritative interpretation approach60 pursued by Article 1131 nafta which has led to a number of sometimes controversial interpretations, including the one that stipulated that nafta's fet does not go beyond the customary international law minimum standard.61 (5 March 2014) ("B. 1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 2. The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens."). The overall limiting tendency underlying the ceta substantive treatment provisions is also evident in the context of full protection and security (fps). However, it is not in the sense that fps would be limited by the customary international law minimum standard, as one might have expected given the nafta heritage of such an approach. As explained by Catharine Titi such an attempt was apparently made by Canada, but obviously rejected by the eu.62 Rather, the limiting element derives from another strand of fps jurisprudence. While the November 2013 draft ceta article containing fps, combined with fet, merely requires that "[e]ach Party shall accord in its territory to investors and to covered investments of the other Party [fair and equitable treatment and] full protection and security […]", paragraph 6 of this article clarifies that "full protection and security" is limited to "physical security."63 This limitation must be understood against the background of a jurisprudential divide according to which some investment tribunals have held that fps would be limited to prevent actual physical security of investors and investments,64 whereas others have considered that the standard would go "beyond physical security."65 If the parties to the bit had intended to limit the obligation to "physical interferences", they could have done so by including words to that effect in the section. In the absence of such words of limitation, the scope of the Article 5(1) protection should be interpreted to apply to reach any act or measure which deprives an investor's investment of protection and full security, providing, in accordance with the Treaty's specific wording, the act or measure also constitutes unfair and inequitable treatment. While the clarification in the draft ceta text will ensure that fps can be invoked only in cases concerning physical interferences with investments, it is questionable whether this will imply a significant reduction of protection for investors since most non-physical interferences often constitute violations of the fet standard.
3.3.3
Non-Discrimination With regard to the non-discrimination standards, national treatment and mfn treatment, the draft ceta text reveals some interesting features that may be relevant for other eu iias as well. Specifically, the text seems to clarify some questions left open in previous eu documents. As may be recalled, the 2011 Council Negotiating Directives merely stated that the negotiations should aim to include "unqualified national treatment" and "unqualified most-favoured nation treatment,"66 whereby it was not quite clear what the term "unqualified" was intended to mean.67
With regard to the formulation of the national treatment clause, the latest version of the ceta negotiating text evidences a clear departure from the traditional European national treatment clauses, limited to the so-called postestablishment phase.68 The draft ceta text extends the scope of the national treatment obligation to establishment, acquisition (and possibly expansion) of investments.69 This clearly evidences an attempt to ensure market access/ treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords, in like situations to its own investors and to their investments with respect to the establishment admission obligations by adopting the Canada/us approach to extend national treatment to establishment phase. The draft national treatment clause of the ceta also departs from the European tradition in so far as it is not fully unqualified, but rather incorporates language, triggering the non-discrimination obligation only "in like situations." This also follows us/Canadian bit traditions70 and is in line with the wishes of the European Parliament.71 While useful, this addition will probably not change much, since many investment tribunals actually adopt a 'like circumstances' or 'like situations' test even in the absence of specific wording.72
Much more relevant will be the text of the mfn clause of the ceta, if adopted in the latest version, expressly excluding isds. While the envisaged text of the mfn provision itself is rather straightforward73 -though possibly also applying in the pre-investment stage74 -, the clarification in a separate paragraph that "treatment" does "not include investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures"75 will have important practical impact.
2 does not include investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures provided for in other international investment treaties and other trade agreements."). This clarification is a direct response to the uncertainty which started with the Maffezini case76 and was exacerbated by numerous tribunals disagreeing whether an mfn clause should permit claimants to invoke more favourable procedural, maybe even jurisdictional,77 provisions in third country bits or at least to overcome procedural obstacles, such as waiting periods,78 or whether it would not permit them to do so.79 Regardless how one stands on this issue, it is obvious that a clarification like the one in the draft ceta is welcome from the perspective of predictability and certainty and will help avoid unnecessary litigation.
Probably the most astonishing insight that the audience of the conference in Vienna learned from Frank Hoffmeister was that it was apparently intended by the negotiating parties of the ceta that mfn should only refer to de facto or de iure treatment, and was not meant to serve as a tool to 'import' better treatment (even substantive treatment) under other investment treaties. As explained in his written contribution to this Special Issue,80 the underlying idea is to prevent an imbalance resulting from the fact that one party may consistently refuse to incorporate certain (substantive) standards in its iias which would make it impossible for investors from the other party to invoke such standards, while the reverse is not true if the other party provides for better/broader standards in some third party iias. This view seems to reflect a 'trade approach' to mfn, since in trade treaties mfn often relates to the de facto treatment given to products from third parties. However, mfn clauses in investment agreements regularly concern treatment obligations found in third-party treaties81 and practically all investment claims invoking mfn do so in order to import better treatment stipulated to investments in third-party treaties.
It will be interesting to see whether tribunals applying the ceta's mfn clause, as currently proposed, in the future will follow this limiting, tradeinspired reading or will rather retain the approach expressed by the Bayindir tribunal according to which by an ordinary mfn clause "the parties to the Treaty did not intend to exclude the importation of a more favourable substantive standard of treatment accorded to investors of third countries."82 3.3.4
Umbrella Clauses The question mark which surrounded the umbrella clause in the Council's Negotiating Directives of 2010 seems to have disappeared. 83 The draft ceta contains an eu suggestion on an umbrella clause. The current text indicates that there is only an eu proposal, but no agreement on the inclusion of an umbrella clause in the ceta. This is not surprising given Canada's general policy not to include umbrella clauses in its iias. 84 The eu has proposed what may have been intended a rather limited umbrella clause, according to which "[e]ach Party shall observe any specific written obligation it has entered into with regard to an investor of the other Party or an investment of such an investor."85
Contrary to the usual formulation of umbrella clauses which refers to 'any obligation,' the eu proposal speaks of 'any specific written obligation.' It is not immediately evident what was intended by this special wording. Given the controversial issue whether normal umbrella clauses relate only to contractual obligations or could also refer to other obligations assumed by host states, for instance, through national legislation or unilateral undertakings, 86 that the wording 'any specific written obligation' was intended to refer only to contracts and not to other commitments. However, that cannot be taken for granted. The eu proposal for an umbrella clause is silent on the most controversial question concerning umbrella clauses in investment arbitration practice, i.e. their practical effect.87 So far, some tribunals follow the approach of sgs v. Pakistan which rejected the view that "breaches of a contract … concluded with a State (widely considered to be a matter of municipal rather than international law) are automatically 'elevated' to the level of breaches of international law."88 Other tribunals adhere to the traditional view endorsed by sgs v. Philippines that an umbrella clause "makes it a breach of the bit for the host State to fail to observe binding commitments, including contractual commitments, which it has assumed with regard to specific investments. But it does not convert the issue of the extent or content of such obligations into an issue of international law."89 As recent eu member state bits demonstrate, it is possible to clarify such uncertainties created by investment case-law.90 European Commission, supra note 1, 9 ("eu clauses ensuring the free transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors should be included." Transfer Provisions There has always been a broad consensus that eu investment treaties should include free transfer of funds provisions.91 Thus, the current ceta draft contains an unsurprising transfer clause according to which "[e]ach Party shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made without restriction or delay and in a freely convertible currency."92
As with other transfer clauses found in bits and iias, the crux of the matter is the scope of the exceptions. The November 2013 draft text contains a number of exceptions that have become more widespread in recent times,93 such as provisions exempting measures relating to bankruptcy, trading in securities, criminal offences and administrative and adjudicatory proceedings.94 In addition, the negotiating text contains an eu proposal that appears to be inspired by the financial crisis according to which temporary safeguard measures may be taken for monetary policy reasons.95
In the past, the Commission has been rather determined to defend the eu's capacity to impose limits on free transfer obligations for political reasons at any time and has even instituted infringement proceedings against member states whose bits contained too broad transfer obligations.96 These concerns cjeu found that even the mere possibility of a potential obstruction of the eu's regulatory power to adopt transfer restrictions by capital transfer clauses in Member State bits was sufficient to lead to an incompatibility with eu law. stem from the fact that the eu has far-reaching powers to adopt restrictive measures under Article 6697 and 215 tfeu98 that may run counter to the guarantee of unhampered transfer of funds. It has been previously suggested that such an exception could resemble the security exception of the EU-Korea fta.99 Whether the formulation found in the November 2013 draft ceta's general exceptions clause which in an eu proposal refers to public security100 will be sufficient to justify derogations from the free transfer of funds obligations remains to be seen.
D Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Investor-state dispute settlement (isds) has long been considered a crucial ingredient of effective investment protection. The direct access of private parties to seek remedies for violations of substantive investment treatment standards has been regarded as an important contribution to enhance the effectiveness of investment protection101 by eliminating the need for an espousal of claims under the traditional diplomatic protection paradigm. At the same time, avoiding the political harassment factor of such espoused interstate claims is considered to lead to a general de-politicization of investment disputes. 102 In spite of the general recognition of these advantages, it was initially, i.e. after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty's new investment powers of the eu unclear whether the eu would strive for isds or rather settle for inter-state dispute settlement, along the trade law paradigm to which the Commission has become accustomed over years of gatt and wto experience.
After an initial orientation phase, the eu institutions finally came out in favour of adopting isds,103 though the European Parliament, in particular, voiced concern about isds.104 This latter concern together with increased pressure from various ngos, lobbying against isds in 2013, gained such political momentum that in early 2014 the eu Commissioner in charge of trade and investment negotiations called for a reflection period to consult the European public on investment and isds. 105 The charges against isds are not new and consist of a mix of serious concerns and irrational as well as partly nonsensical assumptions. As demonstrated by Christian Tams,106 many arguments, currently raised against the eu's investment negotiations, can be traced back to the notorious 2001 ny Times article, likening nafta panels to secret tribunals,107 and fail to take into account numerous developments in investment arbitration since.
Among the standard points of criticism are the lack of transparency of the procedure, the impossibility to appeal investment decisions, the alleged proinvestor bias of tribunals, and overly broad investor rights which would lead to a chilling effect on legitimate regulation by sovereign states. 108 What the vociferous critics appear to overlook are the multiple developments in investment arbitration over the last decade. In 2006, the icsid Arbitration Rules were amended with a view to more transparency, now permitting amicus curiae participation as well more general publication of awards.109 In a similar effort, uncitral adopted Rules on Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration in 2013.110 Though the lack of an appellate structure is typical in international dispute settlement as well as in transnational arbitration, much time and effort has been spent on considering whether some form of appeal would be feasible. While grand designs of amending the icsid Convention have not been pursued,111 many small steps have been taken to ensure the ultimate goal of more consistency, such as appellate mechanisms in individual iias and the use of joint commissions consisting of representatives of the Contracting Parties empowered to give authoritative interpretations of iias.112 The draft ceta chapter on investment is a good example of this tendency, also in so far as it clearly aims at circumscribing the content of investment standards in a more precise way in order to make the outcomes of isds not only more predictable, but also to limit the scope of investor rights. The detailed wording of the ceta's fet, aiming at codifying only the more restrictive elements of fet jurisprudence, is a telling example.113 Equally, the various attempts by treaty-makers in general to integrate broader interests, such as sustainable development, human rights and labour rights and the environment, into iias has been widespread over the last years and they also found a place in the eu's negotiations, not only, but also of ceta. 114 It remains to be seen whether a more detached analysis of the pros and cons of isds will lead the eu negotiators to continue striving for effective dispute settlement mechanisms. The November 2013 draft ceta text on isds115 clearly demonstrates the mutual efforts of the negotiators to agree on a balanced and modern version of investment dispute settlement, including alternative dispute resolution mechanisms like mediation, non-disputing party participation through amicus curiae briefs, a standing "isds Committee,"116 tasked with interpreting the investment chapter, preventing investors from bringing multiple or frivolous claims by imposing heavy litigation cost risks, and introducing a binding code of conduct for arbitrators in order to reduce conflicts of interests.117
Conclusion
Summing up, it appears that the first eu investment chapter in a broader trade agreement, the Canada-EU ceta, will be of distinct European pedigree with a number of nafta-or rather 2004 us/Canada Model bit-inspired additions as well as new features such as further details concerning the exact meaning of fet and other standards. This additional wording will probably serve as useful guidance to arbitrators in determining whether breaches of investment standards have occurred.
Whether the modifications will lead to an overall increase or decrease of investment protection and whether they will enlarge or narrow down the regulatory space of host states will ultimately depend upon the application of the agreement by individual investment tribunals, assuming that the current antiinvestment law campaign does not go as far as to dismantle the entire system.
In any event, the current, fragmented, and only partly visible investment chapter of the Canada-EU ceta may not be a classical Model bit. However, it is likely to serve as an important template also for future eu investment agreements and thus deserves close scrutiny.
